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The history of the Second Age of Globalization (from 1945 through to the present) has traditionally
been told through the lens of either the industrially advanced First World, or, more critically, the
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called “Second World”, the socialist states of the Soviet Union and its Eastern European satellites. The
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The Socialist World in the Second Age of 
Globalization: An Alternative History? 
The history of the Second Age of Globalization (from 1945 through to the 
present) has traditionally been told through the lens of either the industrially 
advanced First World, or, more critically, the developing countries of the 
Third World. Following the collapse of the global economy in the depression 
years of the 1930s and the destruction of WWII, these accounts run, the 
West, under the leadership of the United States, sought to rebuild global 
institutions in line with liberal economic principles. This international liberal 
order that became known as the Bretton Woods system, structured the 
processes of globalization that would continue even after the system’s 
collapse in 1973. Post-war globalization was an expansive process, in 
which developing economies in Latin America, Africa and Asia were 
gradually integrated into economic institutions already rooted in the core 
economies of North America, Western Europe and Japan.  
Such conventional historical accounts of post-war globalization have 
no place for the Soviet Union and its satellites in Eastern Europe – what this 
review will term the “socialist world.” Not until the collapse of communist 
regimes over the years 1989-91 and their subsequent transition to market 
economies, it would seem, were these regions integrated into the global 
economy. There are two reasons for this absence. First, historians of 
globalization have tacked closely to a Cold War paradigm that posits a 
sharp dichotomy between the capitalist and communist worlds. As two 
historians of globalization note, following 1945 “a deliberate attempt [was] 
made to establish a better world order according to two competing models 
in two competing power blocs” (Osterhammel and Petersson 2009, p. 29). 
From this paradigm it follows that, as post-war globalization was bound up 
with the liberal institutions of the capitalist West, the socialist world must 
have pursued a different and rival historical path. This historical perspective 
is complemented by the views of economists and economic historians who 
have typically characterized the socialist world as isolated from broader 
global trends, “cut off from the rest of the world by inward-looking, 
authoritarian regimes” (Jeffrey Sachs 1999, p.3) and “virtual autarchy” 
(Maddison 2013, p. 341).  
The absence of the socialist world in existing historical accounts of 
globalization raises an important question: is there a distinct history of 
socialist globalization separate from that of the capitalist west? Two recent 
books by Oscar Sanchez-Sibony (2014) and Johanna Bockman (2011) 
suggest that, far from pursuing a separate historical trajectory, the socialist 
world was closely entangled with the post-WWII global political economy.  
Sanchez-Sibony’s Red Globalization: The Political Economy of the 
Soviet Cold War from Stalin to Khrushchev is a fascinating revisionist 
history of the Soviet Union and its place in the global economy. Told from 
the perspective of the Ministry of Foreign Trade and its longest-serving 
minister, Anastas Mikoyan, the book disabuses readers of lazy assumptions 
regarding the supposed autarky of the Soviet economy and the primacy of 
ideology over economic pragmatism. While its early chapters certainly 
acknowledge the country’s tendency towards autarky during the conditions 
of the 1930s (a trend that was in keeping with other major economies of the 
time), the bulk of the book highlights the speed with which Soviet officials 
sought to open their country to global trade following WWII. While mostly 
focusing on the country’s relations with more developed western markets, 
the work also provides important insight into Soviet efforts to foster trade 
with the Third World, and the unexpectedly minor role that ideology played 
in cultivating relations with anti-colonial states like India, Cuba and Egypt. 
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Operating in a similar revisionist vein, Markets in the Name of 
Socialism: the Left-Wing Origins of Neoliberalism, by Johanna Bockman, 
offers a counter-intuitive history of the role of socialist economists in 
promoting the global dissemination of market economics. Framed as an 
intellectual history of neo-classical economics, the book traces the 
transnational development of market socialist ideas and examines their 
application in several intriguing case studies: Yugoslavia’s self-
management reforms of the early 1950s, the Hungarian New Economic 
Mechanism of 1968, and the work of left- and right-wing economists at the 
Italian Center for the Study of Economic and Social Problems. While most 
histories of neoliberalism emphasize the struggle that took place between 
Keynesians and monetarists in the United States and Western Europe 
during the 1970s and 1980s, Bockman argues instead for a more nuanced 
intellectual history of neoliberalism that highlights its emergence from 
transnational networks of neo-classical economists that spanned both the 
capitalist West and the socialist East.  
Read together, both of these ambitious books demonstrate that, 
rather than working within a separate and distinct socialist international 
economy, the Soviet Union and its satellite states in Eastern Europe were 
subordinate participants in the dominant liberal global order. The story of 
this entanglement reveals important and unexpected insights into the 
history of the second age of globalization.  
Communism and the Global Revolution 
Ironically, given the absence of the socialist world in conventional historical 
accounts, one of the first descriptions of modern globalization appeared in 
Marx and Engels’ Communist Manifesto of 1848. Identifying what they saw 
as the historically unique tendency for capitalism to expand and reproduce 
itself over ever-greater spaces, these two theorists noted the globalizing 
dynamics of the system: “The need of a constantly expanding market for its 
products chases the bourgeoisie over the whole surface of the globe. It must 
nestle everywhere, settle everywhere, establish connexions everywhere. 
The bourgeoisie has through its exploitation of the world-market given a 
cosmopolitan character to production and consumption in every country” 
(Tucker 1978, p. 476). The need for growth that was built into capitalist 
markets collapsed world space and gradually integrated even the most 
remote parts of the globe into the market system. The global character of 
capitalism, they concluded, meant that the socialist revolution that would 
supersede it also had to be global in scope.  
The global vision of Marx and Engels carried over into those 
movements that inherited their tradition, most consequentially the Bolshevik 
Party that took power during the Russian Revolution of October 1917. For 
Vladimir Lenin, Leon Trotsky, Nikolai Bukharin and other leaders of the 
Bolsheviks, the revolution that began in the imperial capital of St. 
Petersburg had to rapidly expand not just throughout the rest of the Russian 
Empire, but west into Europe and, eventually, throughout the world. It was 
especially urgent for the Russian revolutionaries to be joined by their 
comrades in Central and Western Europe. Russia was, after all, an 
industrially underdeveloped country, dominated overwhelmingly by 
inefficient and technologically backwards agriculture. To modernize the 
country and build socialism, Russia would need the cooperation of the more 
industrially-advanced economies of the West, in particular Germany. 
Although uprisings inspired by the Russian Revolution broke out across 
Central Europe between 1918-1920, with revolutionary movements briefly 
seizing power in Munich, Budapest and Bratislava, these uprisings 
collapsed in the face of counter-revolutions. By 1920 the Bolsheviks found 
themselves in power, but globally isolated.  
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From World Revolution to Socialism in One Country 
The failure of the Russian Revolution to globalize was of enormous concern 
for the Bolshevik leadership and they employed two strategies to try to 
break out of their isolation. The first was to expand their geographical 
horizons and look for support beyond the West. In September 1920 in the 
Azerbaijani city of Baku, the Communist International (COMINTERN) 
brought together hundreds of representatives of nationalist movements 
across Eurasia. This Congress of the Peoples’ of the East called for an 
alliance of communists and anti-colonial forces against European 
colonialism in Asia, the Middle East and Africa that would have a powerful 
influence on national liberation movements in the second half of the 
twentieth century (Riddell 1993). 
But alliances with the colonized world offered no solutions to the 
immediate problems of economic collapse and industrial underdevelopment 
in the Soviet Union. To this end the second strategy the Bolsheviks 
deployed was to actively seek the few opportunities for foreign trade that 
they could. The priority was to achieve a “technology transfer” through the 
import of capital goods from Germany, Britain and the U.S., offset through 
foreign borrowing and exports of primary articles, in particular agricultural 
goods, timber and minerals. Although the market reforms of the New 
Economic Policy, which included the introduction of a new gold-backed 
currency, the chervonets, had by 1924 achieved a degree of 
macroeconomic stabilization, foreign trade lagged (Sanchez-Sibony 2014). 
The situation further deteriorated as the world economy entered the 
depression at the end of the decade. 
Far from resorting to the Keynesian policy of quantitative easing, 
which would later become a central tenet for left wing governments in the 
West, during the years of global depression the Soviets followed orthodox 
liberal teachings and pursued recessionary policies to maintain gold parity. 
While historians have typically explained the brutal industrialization and 
collectivization campaigns of the late 1920s and early 1930s as a result of 
Joseph Stalin’s ideological zealotry, these were, in fact, radical efforts to 
maintain the country’s development strategy of technology transfer. As 
Sanchez-Sibony argues (2014, p. 53), what is remarkable about the Soviet 
Union during the 1930s is not its isolation from the world economy, but 
precisely its continued commitment to the rules of liberal economic 
orthodoxy: “The surprise was that the Soviet Union, unlike many 
economically emerging countries during those years, did not default on its 
debt, preferring to starve the Soviet population instead”. It was only in 1935, 
when the last of the country’s foreign debts were paid off and an industrial 
base had been established, that the Soviets began to adopt more autarkic 
policies, a move that was, by then, in harmony with both New Deal America 
and the fascist economies of Italy and Germany. 
Even as the first socialist country withdrew from the global economy, 
however, it was integrated into an increasingly globalized body of 
knowledge: neoclassical economics. Since the late nineteenth century 
neoclassical economists such as Léon Walras and Vilfredo Pareto, had 
acknowledged the mathematical equivalence between competitive market 
and planned socialist models, meaning that the latter could be a useful 
analytical tool for reflecting on the former. The socialist experiment that 
began in Russia, therefore, offered an important avenue of research for 
neoclassical economics. Although economists within the Soviet Union were 
isolated from advances in the field in the West, figures like Leonid 
Kantorovich continued to develop neoclassical methods to optimize state 
planning (Bockman 2011). Meanwhile, in the West, the Soviet Union served 
as a useful site for research into the emerging field of comparative 
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economics and young scholars like Abram Bergson, an American student 
of the Soviet emigre Wassily Leontief, began researching aspects of the 
Soviet planned economy (Bockman 2011). Precisely because earlier 
theorists had established the mathematical equivalence of the competitive 
market and socialist planning models, research into the Soviet system was 
understood by neoclassical economists to provide insights into Western 
market economies. The knowledge generated by these early transnational 
exchanges help forge the discipline that trained many of the experts and 
advisors that would staff the international financial and trade bodies in the 
post-war era. 
The Socialist World and the Second Age of Globalization 
As noted above, historians of the Second Age of Globalization have tended 
to adopt the Cold War paradigm of a “bipolar” division of the post-war world. 
Within this paradigm the capitalist West operated according to principles of 
liberal trade and multilateralism, while the socialist world pursued autarchic 
policies and bilateral trade. It follows from this zero-sum perspective, then, 
that globalization was a process intimately bound up with and restricted to 
the capitalist world. 
Given the degree to which this approach pervades our understanding 
of post-war globalization, it is counter-intuitive to discover that for much of 
the post-war period, the Soviet Union tirelessly tried to expand its foreign 
trade with both the West and the global South, looking for opportunities to 
restart the technology transfer that guided the country’s economic policy in 
the 1920s. Even more surprisingly, despite scholars typically tracing 
neoliberal economic doctrines to their roots in the Austrian and Chicago 
schools, new research points to the key role played by socialist economists 
from Eastern Europe in promoting anti-planning and market-oriented 
economic models globally. As this research suggests, the socialist world 
was intimately bound up in the Second Age of Globalization, despite efforts 
by the U.S. to marginalize and exclude the Soviets and their satellites. The 
socialist world did not pursue an “alternative globalization,” nor was it a 
world of “virtual autarky”, but rather was shaped by a distinct experience of 
the global liberal economic order established by the West following WWII. 
In the immediate post-war years, the Soviet Union continued to 
pursue an autarkic agenda, partly owing to the way in which the depression 
of the 1930s had shaped its institutions and partly owing to Stalin’s distrust 
of the West. The suspicion was mutual and, from 1947 onwards, the U.S. 
actively sought means to exclude the Soviets and their satellites from the 
new economic order it was establishing (Sanchez-Sibony 2014). Although 
the post-war liberal order cannot be reduced to a U.S. empire, the 
institutions that underpinned the Bretton Woods system reflected 
Washington’s newfound global hegemony (Latham 1997). The pegging of 
the dollar to gold ensured that control over global money supplies gave the 
U.S. a certain coercive power and by 1948 the country held two-thirds of 
the global money reserves (Sanchez-Sibony 2014). In addition, U.S. aid to 
Europe and Japan, essential for rebuilding their economies, often came with 
the political demand that these countries actively exclude the Soviets from 
any post-war settlement in Europe or Eurasia. These efforts quickly bore 
fruit and subsequent dollar shortages crippled the Soviets’ purchasing 
power. To satisfy its import requirements the country came to play the role 
of a “barter partner” with several developing states. Bilateral barter and 
clearing agreements, already in place between the Soviets and their 
Eastern European satellites, would become an important means of the 
country’s integration into the global economy in the 1950s.  
The death of Stalin and rise of the reform-minded Nikita Khrushchev 
marked a significant shift for the Soviets and their place in the global 
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economy. The years after WWII marked a steady growth in Soviet foreign 
trade, shooting up from a dismal 500 million rubles in 1938 to a 2.9 billion 
in 1950 and, five years later, reaching 5.8 billion (Sanchez-Sibony 2014, p. 
93). Two factors led to this rapid growth during the late-1950s and early-
1960s. First, Khrushchev broke with Stalin’s paranoid approach to foreign 
trade, and pioneered a more open and pragmatic policy, empowering the 
long-serving Minister of Foreign Trade, Anastas Mikoyan, to reform and 
expand Soviet trade networks. Second, Khrushchev’s rise to power 
dovetailed with the final stages of economic reconstruction in Western 
Europe and Japan, giving these states greater autonomy from the U.S. and 
a willingness to begin to explore trade relations with the Soviets. In Japan, 
where industrialists hoped to gain access to Siberia’s vast natural 
resources, there was strong domestic pressure to open trade with the 
Soviets and in December 1957 the two countries signed the first of many 
trade agreements. Soviet-Japanese trade doubled in the subsequent three 
years, and grew beyond this after 1960 (Sanchez-Sibony 2014, p. 103). A 
year later, the controversial director of the Italian state energy sector, Enrico 
Mattei, eager to break the Anglo-American monopoly on international oil 
supplies, signed a contract with the Soviets for the delivery of crude oil. The 
subsequent expansion of this agreement in the 1960s, which became a 
means for the Soviets to build an advanced pipeline network using Western 
capital and technology, laid the basis for Western Europe’s future reliance 
on Russian and Central Asian oil and gas resources. The Italian deal was a 
sign of things to come in Western Europe, and in the following decade East-
West trade in Europe grew steadily. The Soviets even managed to make 
gains in the hold-out state of West Germany, with trade between the two 
countries reaching 500 million rubles by 1970 (Sanchez-Sibony 2014, p. 
190). 
The opening up of Japan and Western Europe to Soviet trade helped 
fuel the rapid growth of the latter’s economy, as Sanchez-Sibony (2014 p. 
92) notes: “As the Soviet economy grew at already dizzying rates of 8-10 
percent during the 1950s, foreign trade grew even faster at an average rate 
of more than 12 percent for that decade.” Increased commercial ties with 
the capitalist world, however, also exposed the weaknesses of the Soviet 
command economy. As buyers in the First and Third worlds complained of 
the poor quality of Soviet goods, jeopardizing future trade deals, Soviet 
leaders were forced to develop quality controls to keep up with Western 
producers. Despite the state’s revolutionary effort to construct an optimally-
planned national economy, the competitive pressures of world markets 
made themselves felt within Soviet borders. As the Marxist theorist, Tony 
Cliff, once observed, far from the vision of communism that captured Marx 
and Engels’ imaginations, the Soviet economic system increasingly came 
to function as a form of state capitalism. Although the productive powers 
remained firmly in the hands of the state, the need to compete within a 
global capitalist system subjected the Soviets to the same compulsions of 
profit accumulation and expansion that characterized capitalist economies 
(Cliff 1974). As Sanchez-Sibony’s work demonstrates, the possibilities of 
socialist development in the Soviet Union were strictly delimited, and even 
deformed, by the conditions set by an international economic system that 
remained capitalist. 
The opening up of the socialist world under Khrushchev expanded 
the space for reform-minded economists across Eastern Europe to rethink 
the Soviet model and its viability. From the mid-1950s Yugoslav, Hungarian, 
Polish and Czechoslovak economists began to explore neoclassical 
methods and to experiment with market socialist ideas. Yugoslavia was the 
first to break with the Soviet model. Following the country’s split with 
Moscow in 1948, Yugoslav communists sought to craft a decentralized 
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system of socialism that divested power from the central state and 
integrated the population into the political and economic institutions on a 
participatory basis. “Worker self-management”, as this system came to be 
known, transformed the Yugoslav economy, devolving managerial powers 
to elected workers’ councils and introducing market reforms to determine 
wages and prices. For Yugoslav reformers, the market offered a means for 
the Marxist goal of the “withering away of the state” and a viable alternative 
to the authoritarian, centralized model of Stalinism. The introduction of 
market mechanisms within the domestic economy, quickly opened the 
country up to foreign markets and by the mid-1960s Yugoslavia was deeply 
integrated into global trade and capital flows (Unkovski-Korica 2016). 
Although slower-paced, the turn towards market solutions to the 
problems of socialism gained legitimacy across the more industrialized 
societies of Eastern Europe in the 1950s and 1960s, promoting a dialogue 
between western liberals and eastern socialists that centered on the 
techniques of neoclassical economics. After WWII the U.S.-based 
economist, Oskar Lange, returned to his native Poland to use his skills in 
neoclassical analysis, particularly his expertise in general equilibrium 
theories, to plan the Polish socialist system. In 1954 the rise of the reform-
minded Imre Nagy in Hungary, provided support to neoclassical and market 
socialist economists who pursued market reforms. These reforms reached 
a peak in 1968 with the introduction of the New Economic Mechanism, 
which effectively transformed Hungary into a market socialist system similar 
to Yugoslavia and opened the country up to the global economy (Bockman 
2011). These trends in Eastern European economic thinking provided the 
basis for a dialogue between economists in the capitalist and socialist 
worlds, often leading to strange bedfellows, from revolutionary socialists to 
neoliberals. Precisely because market socialists and neoliberals “shared 
the idea of an optimizing market mechanism” they were able to “develop a 
neoclassical dialogue about socialism” that reached across what Cold War 
historians have typically assumed were two rival and self-enclosed 
economic orders (Bockman 2011, p. 122).  
Indeed, neoclassical models of socialism were not restricted to the 
Eastern bloc. As the socialist world was integrated into the global economy 
during the 1950s, it established ties with the developing economies of the 
Third World. By the late-1960s Eastern European economists were 
regularly being deployed as advisors to developing states, either through 
bilateral ties or through the global institutions of the Bretton Woods system. 
During the late-1960s and early-1970s the Hungarian neoclassical 
economists Andras Brody and Tamos Szentes helped design economic 
departments at the universities of Lusaka and Dar es Salaam, respectively. 
Hungarians and Yugoslavs also worked at the World Bank, where they were 
often appointed to advise developing countries with left wing governments. 
Yugoslavia also played a key role in promoting neoclassical economics and 
market socialist models through its leading involvement in the Non-Aligned 
Movement. Fluency in the language of neoclassical economics allowed 
Eastern European market socialists to move in the transnational networks 
that underpinned the global economic order during the Second Age of 
Globalization.  
Conclusion 
What was the experience of the socialist world in the Second Age of 
Globalization? Bockman and Sanchez-Sibony’s texts provide three general 
observations. First, and most significantly, this experience was not one of 
self-isolation and autarky, but of exclusion. Post-war globalization was not 
characterized by two rival global economic orders – one capitalist, the other 
socialist – but rather by a single liberal capitalist economic order on the 
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margins of which the Soviets and their East European satellites were forced 
to operate. Second, their marginal position within this liberal order forced 
the Soviets to rely on specific strategies, such as bartering and clearing 
agreements that allowed peripheral economies to conserve their precious 
dollar reserves. The socialist experience of globalization was one built less 
through multilateral institutions than through ad hoc bilateral arrangements. 
This strategy restricted the possibilities open to the socialist economies, in 
particular limiting access to emerging technologies from the advanced 
capitalist economies. Finally, and perhaps most unexpectedly, the socialist 
world was integrated into a dense set of intellectual ties that spanned the 
three worlds of the Cold War. This was especially the case in the discipline 
of neoclassical economists, which offered an important site of intellectual 
exchange between a diverse set of thinkers. The centrality of neoclassical 
economists to the shaping of the global economy during the post-war era, 
meant that, even as it was marginal(ized) in global trade, the socialist world 
was deeply integrated into the intellectual processes that characterized the 
Second Age of Globalization. 
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